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ABSTRACT
Although the extant literature has investigated how individuals engage in
inappropriate behaviors based on the rational choice theory (RCT) (e.g., computer
misconduct), the neutralization theory (e.g., IS security policies violation), and workarounds
under normal situations, it has given little consideration to how individuals are involved in
misuse of information systems with a good intention under the context of disasters. To fill this
research gap, we propose a selfless misuse model, which offers a theoretical explanation for
the concept of individuals’ selfless misuse intention under uncertainty caused by disasters. In
this study, we show why employees make decisions to misuse the information system to
ensure delivery of health services and business continuity. In addition, we explore the way of
reducing this misuse behavior by introducing the role of system resilience in assisting
employees to make better decisions and act positively.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
Hospitals’ information systems have been shown to be exposed to internal (e.g.,
inadequate behavior) (Gordon et al. 2005) and external threats (e.g., extreme incident), and
that more than three-quarters of security breaches were resulted from inside activity (Ernst
and Young 2002). Especially, employees’ abuse and misuse of IS resources have been
considered as the major information security issue related to insiders since employees are
assumed to simply choose to engage in inappropriate behaviors (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). For
instance, in a recent study (Hu et al. 2011), individuals intend to commit violations (e.g.,
computer misconduct) based on their assessment of perceived intrinsic benefits and perceived
intrinsic costs. The results suggest that their perceived intrinsic benefits dominate their
perceived intrinsic costs in the rational decision-making process, therefore individuals’
intrinsic satisfactions (e.g., thrill and happiness) gained from the misconduct are very
influential on individuals’ behavioral choice. In another study (Siponen and Vance 2010), it
was found that employees intend to violate IS security policies based on several neutralization
techniques (e.g., defense of necessity). Additionally, many studies have found that when
employees experience difficulties in working around operational failures in a policycompliant manner, they will engage in risky workarounds to complete their tasks (Ash et al.
2004; Halbesleben et al. 2008; Holden et al. 2013; Koppel et al. 2008). These might be
considered as several types of insider threats to disrupt their information systems under
normal situations. However, even though we consider these types of behavior to be
motivations for individuals to misuse, individuals’ decision to misuse may be different across
various situations they are placed. In this study, we argue that individuals’ intention to misuse
relies on their intrinsic motivations as out of interest, which are used as intrinsic benefit (e.g.,
accomplishment) and intrinsic cost (e.g., stress).
Interestingly, in extreme situations, employees in hospitals can spark their intrinsic
motivations for their decision making to misuse HIS differently from normal situations.
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Individuals make poor decisions about disaster management due to psychological,
organizational, and economic reasons (Michel-Kerjan and Slovic 2010), and they tend to act
altruistically when experiencing natural disasters (i.e., giving, helping and sharing) (Li et al.
2013). Since disaster situations can place employees in unfamiliar situations that demand
timely actions so that increase their uncertainty. Due to uncertainty from these urgent
situations, employees may act with limited rational decision making process and intend to
engage in misuse as a “good enough” solution (Simon 1996) for the sake of delivery of health
services and business continuity. In this case, misusing IS resources for them to conduct their
work is more likely to be their responsibility even though their behaviors should not be
encouraged to do so. This phenomenon shows the bright aspect of general misuse concept
(i.e., selfless misuse) which is brought by contextual boundary.

Statement of the problem
The extant literature has only investigated how individuals engage in inappropriate
behaviors based on the rational choice theory (RCT) (e.g., computer misconduct) (Hu et al.
2011), the neutralization theory (e.g., IS security policies violation) (Siponen and Vance
2010), and workarounds (Ash et al. 2004; Halbesleben et al. 2008; Holden et al. 2013; Koppel
et al. 2008) under normal situations. Despite the numerous research on the dark side of
malicious misuse, however, it has given little consideration to how individuals are involved in
this selfless misuse of information systems to perform their tasks under the context of
disasters.
This unexplored area leads to research questions for further examination of
employees’ HIS misuse during disaster situations: (1) What makes employees selflessly
misuse their hospital information systems under disaster situations? We consider perceived
system risk and resilience, which are considered as two sides of one coin, as main factors
affecting organizations’ vulnerability (Sheffi and Rice Jr 2005) and the negative/positive
consequences of extreme events (Heal and Kunreuther 2007). In addition, (2) How do
employees’ intrinsic cost and benefit influence their decision making to selflessly misuse HIS
and intermediate the two factors on selfless misuse in disaster situations?
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Objectives of the project
The goal of this study is to understand the way of employees’ selfless misuse behavior
by incorporating intrinsic cost and benefit under the context of disasters. Specifically, we
investigate the effect of perceived system risk and resilience on employees’ HIS selfless
misuse. Second, drawing on the bounded rationality (Cornish and Clarke 1986), we examine
how employees’ intrinsic cost and benefit are affected by uncertainty causing the bounded
rationality, and how they work together to mediate the relationship between perceived system
risk and resilience, and selfless misuse intention.

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Even though earlier empirical studies have shown the importance of sanctions,
information security policy, and information awareness programs in reducing IS misuse
behavior (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Pahnila et al. 2007), individuals may
still tend to engage in inappropriate behaviors for other reasons. Therefore, in the IS security
literature, multiple theories and concepts have been applied to explain individual rational
behaviors in terms of information security. For example, based on the neutralization theory,
individuals have been found to rationalize their violations of security policies by using several
neutralization techniques (e.g., defense of necessity) (Siponen and Vance 2010). In addition,
some studies have shown that a decision to engage in criminal behavior is a function of the
subjective expectations of cost and benefit by the individual (Becker 1968; Cornish and
Clarke 2014; Paternoster and Simpson 1996). Other studies have shown that individuals seem
to be not motivated to comply with security policies. For instance, in one study (Stanton et al.
2005), it was suggested that employees may not be motivated to protect their organization’s
information and technology resources as required by the information security policy. In
another study (Pahnila et al. 2007), based on the protection motivation theory (PMT) and
deterrence theory, it was found that both the effects of coping appraisal (e.g., response
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost), and sanctions were not significant regarding
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employees’ behavior towards IS security policy compliance. Furthermore, many studies have
found that when employees experience difficulties in working around operational failures in a
policy-compliant manner, they will engage in risky workarounds to complete their tasks (Ash
et al. 2004; Halbesleben et al. 2008; Holden et al. 2013; Koppel et al. 2008). Although the
growing interest and research efforts in studying individuals’ rational behavior in terms of
information security based on the rational choice theory (RCT) (McCarthy 2002),
neutralization theory (Siponen and Vance 2010), protection motivation theory (PMT),
deterrence theory (Pahnila et al. 2007), and workarounds (Debono et al. 2013; Koppel et al.
2008; Tucker and Hall 2013), some critical questions remain unanswered, especially under
the context of disasters. The literature has investigated individual rational behaviors such as
engaging in IS misuse, violations, workarounds, and complying with security policies under
normal situations, on the other hand, it has neglected the context of disruptions and disasters.
Since organizations have been facing various disruptions caused by natural disasters (e.g.,
hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis), there is a clear need for understanding the
issues regarding individual rational behaviors in engaging in IS misuse in such situations. In
the following subsections, we explain how the rational choice theory (RCT), neutralization
theory, protection motivation theory (PMT), deterrence theory, and workarounds may not be
directly applicable under the context of disasters. Then, we concentrate on the concept of
bounded rationality, cost-benefit approach, and selfless misuse regarding individual
behaviors, which are brought by the context of disasters.

Rational Choice Theory (RCT)
According to the rational choice theory (RCT), individuals tend to behave rationally,
and they determine how they will act by balancing the costs and benefits of their options.
Basically, individuals have preferences for outcomes, so they perceive each outcome to be
associated with a cost or a benefit depending on how much satisfaction the outcome will
produce for them (McCarthy 2002). Hence, they shape their overall assessment of the costs
and benefits of their course of action based on their perceptions of the potential outcomes
associated with that course of action (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). In this case, from a rationalchoice perspective, individuals frame security measures as interference with their job
responsibilities and the practical accomplishment of their work based on their perspectives of
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IS security in terms of costs and benefits (Dourish et al. 2004; Post and Kagan 2007),
therefore they ignore policies and bypass security measures if that can improve their job
performance and help them to do their work (Guo et al. 2011).
Despite the RCT has been shown to be useful in explaining behaviors, it is not exempt
from criticism, especially under the context of disasters. In rational decision making,
individuals’ choices are harmonious with their preferences (McCarthy 2002). Basically, when
individuals make a decision based on their assessment of costs and benefits, the decision
should be consistent with their preferences in order to be rational (Bulgurcu et al. 2010).
Otherwise, under the context of disasters, individuals experience extreme situations that can
affect their rational decision-making process, and the way they act as they normally do under
normal situations. Since disasters can increase pressure to act quickly, and place responders at
risk (Kathleen Geale 2012), individuals will be forced to make quick decisions to behave.
Hence, individuals may not be able to make optimal decisions that are consistent with their
preferences due to time limitation and risks brought by the disaster context. In this case, since
rationality is based on the consistency between individuals’ choices and preferences
(McCarthy 2002), the rational choice theory (RCT) may not be applicable under the context
of disaster.

Neutralization Theory
According to the neutralization theory, Siponen and Vance (2010) proposed a
neutralization model that suggests that employees rationalize their violations of security
policies by using several neutralization techniques (e.g., denial of responsibility, denial of
injury, and the defense of necessity). Based on their findings, the neutralization techniques
had a significant positive effect on employee intentions to violate IS security policies, and the
effects of sanctions were not significant in the study. In addition, neutralization techniques
have previously been successfully applied to explain rule-breaking behaviors (Pershing 2003)
and predict corporate crime (Piquero et al. 2005). However, even though prior studies have
shown that these neutralization techniques have been used successfully by individuals when
rationalizing their violation behaviors, they may not be applied under the context of disaster.
For example, under normal situations, individuals act normally and rationally when using
these neutralization techniques to justify their actions (e.g., IS violations). But, in the context
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of disaster, such lack of information (Amaratunga et al. 2009), risks, and pressure (Kathleen
Geale 2012) can limit individuals’ ability to act normally and use such technique to
rationalize their behaviors. In addition, using neutralization techniques such as denial of
responsibility (e.g., denying responsibility for actions), denial of injury (e.g., justifying
actions by minimizing the harm they cause) (Sykes and Matza 1957), and defense of necessity
(e.g., viewing actions as necessary) (Minor 1981) may not be strong motivations or reasons
for individuals to misuse IS, especially during extreme situations. Individuals make poor
decisions about disaster management due to psychological, organizational, and economic
reasons (Michel-Kerjan and Slovic 2010), and they tend to act altruistically when
experiencing natural disasters (i.e., giving, helping and sharing) (Li et al. 2013). Hence,
misusing IS for them will be more likely their responsibility and beyond the neutralization
techniques. Thus, under the context of disasters, the neutralization theory may not be
applicable and good enough to explain individuals’ IS misuse or violation behaviors.

Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
The protection motivation theory (PMT) is an explanatory theory that predicts
individuals’ intention to engage in protective actions (Anderson and Agarwal 2010). It
originates from both the threat appraisal and the coping appraisal. Threat appraisal has been
defined as individuals’ assessment of the level of danger posed by a threatening event while
the coping appraisal describes their assessment of their ability to cope with and avert the
potential loss or damage arising from the threat (Woon et al. 2005). The PMT has been found
useful in predicting individuals’ behaviors related to computer security (Anderson and
Agarwal 2010) and information systems security policy compliance (Ifinedo 2012). For
instance, in a recent study (Pahnila et al. 2007), based on the protection motivation theory
(PMT), it was found that the effect of coping appraisal (e.g., response efficacy, self-efficacy,
and response cost) was not significant regarding employees’ behavior towards IS security
policy compliance. Despite the capability of the protection motivation theory (PMT) to
explain individuals’ intention to engage in protective actions (e.g., ISSP compliance), it does
not explain why individuals break rules (e.g., IS misuse or violation). In general, protective
actions seem to represent the opposite of IS misuse. In addition, since individuals make poor
decisions (Michel-Kerjan and Slovic 2010), behave quickly due to being at risks (Kathleen
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Geale 2012), and act altruistically (Li et al. 2013) during disaster situations, they may not
consider engaging in protective actions. This is consistent with the study that suggests that
employees may not be motivated to protect their organization’s information and technology
resources as required by the information security policy (Stanton et al. 2005). Hence, the
protection motivation theory (PMT) may not be operational under both the context of disaster
and IS misuse.

Deterrence Theory
The deterrence theory has been applied in many studies to investigate the effects of
organizational deterrent measures on individual behaviors. For instance, in one study (D'Arcy
et al. 2009), an extended deterrence model was proposed to examine the effects of perceived
severity and certainty of sanctions on IS misuse intention. It was found that the effect of
perceived severity of sanctions on IS misuse intention was significant, on the other hand, the
effect of perceived certainty of sanctions was not, which is contrary to what is expected in the
deterrence theory. In another study (Siponen and Vance 2010), a neutralization model was
proposed that suggests that employees’ violations of security policies is not always best
explained by fear of sanctions because employees use several neutralization techniques.
Based on the findings, the effects of sanctions were not significant. Furthermore, based on the
general deterrence theory, Pahnila et al. (2007) has examined the effects of sanctions on
employees’ intention to comply with IS security policies. However, the effects of sanctions
were not significant as well in the study. The deterrence theory may help to explain why
individuals comply with computer use or security rules (e.g., by not engaging in IS misuse),
but it does not explain why individuals break these rules or engage in IS misuse. This is
consistent with the studies mentioned earlier that have shown that the effects of deterrence are
not conclusive. Therefore, since the deterrence theory is not applicable in explaining the
reasons behind individuals’ IS misuse under normal situations, it will not be operational in the
context of disaster as well.
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Workarounds
Workarounds have been classified as hindrance (e.g., circumvent system procedures or
process perceived to be too time consuming, onerous or difficult), harmless (e.g., do not
significantly affect workflow), and essential (e.g., to complete the tasks at hand) (Burns et al.
2015; Ferneley and Sobreperez 2006). These workarounds are compensative responses that
aim to achieve a work goal that otherwise would have been blocked by operational failures
(Halbesleben et al. 2008; Kobayashi et al. 2005). According to the literature, healthcare
providers often engage in these workarounds when perceiving inconveniences or
inefficiencies to meet the pressing needs of the situational context (Debono et al. 2013;
Koppel et al. 2008; Tucker and Hall 2013). Basically, healthcare providers have a workaround
culture in which employees work around operational failures to improve their organizational
performance (Koppel et al. 2008). For instance, in a recent study (Burns et al. 2015), the role
of contextual integrity was examined to understand workaround decsions in the helthcare
sector. The purpose of the study was to analyze healthcare employees’ willingness to engage
in a series of electronic medical record (EMR) workaround scenarios. It was found that
healthcare employees were less inclined to engage in workaround behaviors that violate
patient privacy and do not directly impact patient care (e.g., sharing credentials and using a
file transfer app to transfer unencrypted patient records). Otherwise, they were more inclined
to engage in workaround behaviors that invlove patient treatment and dealing with a system
failure (e.g., delegating system use to other employees and using personal device to transfer
patient files). Workarounds have been considered necessary to deliver care and not legally
sanctioned (Debono et al. 2013), but they can lead to circumvent privacy safegaurds built into
systems and formalized routines (Murphy et al. 2014). This is consistent with many studies
that have found that when employees experience difficulties in working around operational
failures in a policy-compliant manner, they will engage in risky workarounds to complete
their tasks (Ash et al. 2004; Halbesleben et al. 2008; Holden et al. 2013; Koppel et al. 2008).
Even though the concept of workarounds has shown that individuals engage in IS misuse
(e.g., risky workarounds), especially under the context of operational failures and patient care,
individuals may engage in IS misuse for other reasons in different contexts. For example,
under normal situations, employees rationalize their risky workaround behaviors based on
specific conditions such as patient care and operational failures. Hence, they engage in
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workaround behaviors that only involve patient care and operational failures, but not those
workaround behaviors that violate patient privacy (e.g., sharing credentials or IS misuse)
(Burns et al. 2015). However, under the context of disaster, employees do not act normally
and rationally due to the extreme situations they experience such as lack of information
(Amaratunga et al. 2009), risks, and pressure (Kathleen Geale 2012). Thus, their
rationalization of their workaround behaviors will be affected and limited. In this case, since
they act altruistically during disasters (Li et al. 2013), they may engage in workaround
behaviors that even violate patient privacy (e.g., IS misuse) for sake of both patient care and
business continuity. Hence, the concept of workarounds is limited in explaining the exact
reasons behind individuals’ IS misuse. This is due to its lack of considering the situational
factors that can limit individuals’ rationality under the context of disaster.

Bounded Rationality under Extreme Events
Disasters bring unique situations that place individuals at risk and pressure them to act
quickly. This urgent situation can affect the way individuals act as they normally do under
normal situations and may force them to make quick decisions to behave. Therefore, our
understanding of the factors that motivate individuals to engage in IS misuse behavior under
the context of disasters is still limited. According to Simon (1990), individuals’ rationality can
be limited by their cognitive ability and information availability. For example, risk and
uncertainty may affect the way individuals make decisions while lack of information may
pose a considerable limitation on their decision-making process (Simon 1972). Additionally,
the complexity of a situation may make it difficult for individuals to simplify the
circumstances in order to make optimal decisions. Therefore, Simon (1972) argues that these
limitations are the main reasons behind the bounded rationality in individuals’ decisionmaking process. As a result, in an effort to compensate for these limitations, decision-makers
in this view act as satisfiers who aim to seek a solution that can be considered “good enough”
while considering the effort required to obtain it and the resources available (Simon 1996).
There have been several contexts which confine individuals’ decision-making. For instance,
disasters can reduce access to information (Amaratunga et al. 2009), increase difficulties for
communication and collaboration (Lizarralde and Massyn 2008), increase pressure to act
quickly, and place responders at risk (Kathleen Geale 2012). Due to these contexts, decision-
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makers act within high levels of uncertainty (Simon 1996), which particularly gives them no
choice between satisfactory and optimal solutions except accepting a “satisficing” solution
(Bouraoui and Lizarralde 2013). This limited rationality could be more extreme in hospital
context. Since disasters can reduce users’ accessibility to information, increase difficulties for
them to communicate and collaborate with colleagues, increase pressure to act quickly, and
highly likely place them at risk, they could become unable to find or process all the
information about patients or the organization (i.e., cognitive limitations). These cognitive
limitations could encourage them to act under the certain level of uncertainty.

Uncertainty from Disasters
Uncertainty is defined as individuals’ perception of themselves as unable to predict
something accurately (Milliken 1987). Uncertainty has been shown to come from lack of
information, which makes it difficult for individuals to construct a plausible interpretation
about situations. For example, individuals may be unable to precisely estimate the
consequences of their current actions on the future (March 1994), such as if employees
engage in selfless misuse will harm their organization in terms of information security or if
they do not engage in selfless misuse will harm it in terms of patient care and business
continuity. Hence, due to individuals’ inability to foresee the consequences of their current
actions, this may lead them to construct an occasion for sensemaking during which they try to
reduce their uncertainty (Weick 1995). Uncertainty about one’s perceptions, attitudes,
feelings, and behaviors has a powerful motivational effect, therefore individuals who are
uncertain about their identity are particularly motivated to reduce uncertainty (Van Lange et
al. 2011).
In this study, uncertainty is defined as lack of confidence in individuals’ ability to
predict particular outcomes (Penrod 2001). Our interests specifically lie in individuals’ sense
of unpredictability about the safety of patients, safety of hospital, capability of HIS to recover,
and their ability to perform the job under the context of disaster.

Cost-benefit Approach
Literature shows that individuals are sensitive to the consequences of their actions and
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make reasoned judgements based on the cost-benefit analysis of the intended acts (Becker
1968; Cornish and Clarke 2014; Paternoster and Simpson 1996). According to the rational
choice theory (RCT), individuals tend to behave rationally, and they determine how they will
act by balancing the costs and benefits of their options. Basically, individuals have
preferences for outcomes, so they perceive each outcome to be associated with a cost or a
benefit depending on how much satisfaction the outcome will produce for them (McCarthy
2002). Hence, they shape their overall assessment of the costs and benefits of their course of
action based on their perceptions of the potential outcomes associated with that course of
action (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). In rational decision making, individuals’ choices are
harmonious with their preferences (McCarthy 2002). Basically, when individuals make a
decision based on their assessment of costs and benefits, the decision should be consistent
with their preferences in order to be rational (Bulgurcu et al. 2010).
However, under the context of disasters, this cost-benefit approach is used differently
than it is under normal situations. This is due to the high level of uncertainty from disasters,
which can affect individuals’ decision-making process by causing bounded rationality.
Individuals are unable to foresee the consequences of their current actions under uncertainty,
therefore they may engage in sensemaking for the sake of reducing their uncertainty (Weick
1995). Sensemaking is the complex cognitive process, which individuals engage in under
complex and high-risk situations (Weick 1995). Thus, we argue that this complex cognitive
process may cause employees to act based on a reasonable and limited cost-benefit analysis.
Since intrinsic motivations can influence individual intentions regarding an activity (Davis et
al. 1992), in this study, these costs and benefits may be considered as intrinsic motivations for
employees’ HIS use behavior since they would need rational reasons under the disaster
context when they decide to selflessly misuse their HIS.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Perceived System Risk
Employees perceive system risks based on their subjective expectations and
assessments of the risks caused by damage or loss to information systems (Straub and Welke
1998), therefore they face feelings of discomfort or anxiety (Dowling and Staelin 1994),
concern (Zaltman and Wallendorf 1983), uncertainty (Engel et al. 1986), and cognitive
dissonance (Festinger 1957). Perceived risk increases the levels of expectation and pessimism
regarding information systems’ capabilities in supporting employees’ jobs, which negatively
influences individual performances, and then leads to employees’ avoidance and ineffective
use of the organization’s information systems (Park et al. 2015). So in the context of disasters,
this perception of system risks will be very high because disasters can reduce employees’
sense of safety (Kroon and Overdijk 1993), highlight and amplify their personal insecurities
and feelings of vulnerability (Wolfenstein 1957), and increase their stress levels, which in turn
negatively affects the image of the organization’s capabilities. Since fear to lose of all or a
portion of the healthcare information system (HIS) functionality would quickly compromise
clinical and business processes, which can potentially have far-reaching effects such as patient
injury, legal liability, and significant financial loss to the organization (Paustian et al. 2002),
employees could increase their perception of system risks that eventually could impact their
behavior (Heal and Kunreuther 2007), prevent their positive action (Jiang and Klein 1999),
and negatively influence their performances (Park et al. 2015).

System Resilience
Resilience has been defined as the “system’s ability to anticipate and respond to
anomalous circumstances so as to maintain safe function, recover, and return to stable
equilibrium (to the original operating state or to a different state)” (Sheridan 2008). In
addition, resilience has been identified with three central features, which are systems’ ability
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to absorb or buffer disturbances and still maintain their core attributes, systems’ ability to selforganize, and systems’ capacity for learning and adaptation in the context of change (Berkes
et al. 2008). Based on prior studies, resilience has been shown to help in the reduction of the
consequences of negative events (Heal and Kunreuther 2007), therefore it is important in the
context of disasters due to its capability to bounce back (Wildavsky 1988). Resilient
infrastructures have been shown to enable organizations to maintain positive adjustment under
challenging conditions (Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003) by reducing their vulnerabilities (Sheffi
and Rice Jr 2005) and providing them with the means to target resource investments through
integrating safety and productivity concerns (Nemeth et al. 2008).
So, in hospital context, lack of system resilience under disasters could be very
extreme. For example, in hospital, disasters can reduce access to information (Amaratunga et
al. 2009) and amplify personal insecurities and feelings of vulnerability (Wolfenstein 1957),
therefore employees’ stress levels and perceptions of system risk will increase (Park et al.
2015), which in turn negatively affect their feelings about the usage of the healthcare
information system (HIS) and increase their intention to misuse it for the sake of delivery of
health services and business continuity.
In fact, in the interview with the chief information officers of hospitals that were
affected by the October 2006 snowstorm of western New York,
“When the employees felt that the risk to the system was high, it
impacted the perception of the usefulness of the systems and caused users to
switch to manual systems much earlier [on receipt of the impending
snowstorm warning—which later turned into an unanticipated disaster] and
after the storm, they did not believe the IT department’s notifications that
the disaster recovery process had been completed and they did not switch
back to the HIS even though they were repeatedly reminded. This
consequently had an impact on the efficiency of patient care and slowed
patient care for days after the snowstorm.” (in Park et al., 2015, p. 319).
We believe that increasing system resilience (the capabilities for rebounding quickly)
will reduce the hospitals’ vulnerabilities and improve their processes in ensuring the delivery
of health services and business continuity. For instance, a study has explained how system
resilience can play an important role in ensuring delivery of health services. It illustrates that
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gaps in the continuity of care prove that healthcare information systems (HIS) are unable to
respond with sufficient output to meet demand, therefore the ability of systems to respond to
fill such gaps in care continuity indicates their resilience (Nemeth et al. 2008). Hence, we
posit that a high level of system resilience in hospitals will reduce employees’ perceptions of
system risk, which will in turn affect their feelings (e.g., intrinsic benefits and intrinsic costs)
about misusing the healthcare information system (HIS). In this study, we define system
resilience as employees’ beliefs regarding the capacity of the information systems to maintain
and cope with damages or losses (Rose 2004).

Conceptualization of Selfless Misuse under Disaster Context
In general, IS misuse refers to individuals’ inappropriate behavior in using IS
resources (Magklaras and Furnell 2001). This misuse behavior is quite varied that ranges from
behaviors that are unethical and/or inappropriate to those that are illegal. IS misuse behaviors
cover four areas: (1) sharing passwords, (2) unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information, (3) unauthorized access to restricted information, (4) inappropriate usage of
email in the workplace. Sharing passwords has been identified as one of the major security
issues that can lead to a loss of confidence about hospitals’ ability to stick to HIPAA
guidelines (Park et al. 2015). Unauthorized access to computerized data has been reported as
one of the most common types of breaches in organizations (Richardson 2007). In addition,
inappropriate usage of email in the workplace has been shown to place organizations at
financial or legal risk (D'Arcy et al. 2009). Although these four behaviors do not count all
possible IS misuse types, they are the ones employees may engage in when attempting to
ensure delivery of health services and business continuity during disaster situations. Thus, we
consider them as representative of typical IS misuse issues often encountered by
organizations, which include accessibility, privacy, property, and accuracy (Mason 1986).
In disaster context, individuals’ misuse behavior highly likely appears in different
aspects from normal situations. The unexpectedness and urgency from disaster contexts may
inevitably cause individuals to inappropriately use their IS resources to do their job. In this
case, misusing IS resources to conduct their work is more likely to be their responsibility even
though their behaviors should not be encouraged to do so. Since disasters can reduce users’
accessibility to information, lead them to difficult communications and collaborations with
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colleagues, increase pressure to act quickly, and highly likely place them at risk, they could
become a cognitively limited state of mind to find or process all the information about
patients or the organization. Even as a disaster situation triggers uncertainty for individuals to
be irrational or limited rational thinking, it could be more difficult for them to decide whether
they misuse the resources.
Especially, in hospital context, employees’ decision to misuse seems to be extremely
hard under the disaster context because they are under the thin line between patient care and
following rules in using their resources such as HIS. Thus, when employees decide to misuse
HIS under disaster context, they are more likely to do it not because of their own selfish
purposes (e.g., satisfaction) but because of moral or ethical issues, such as ensuring the
delivery of health services to patients and to continue their business. This different purpose of
misuse in hospitals could result in the uniqueness of this study that HIS misuse reflects a
bright aspect of general misuse concept which is brought by contextual boundary. Based on
the bright side of misuse, we use the term ‘selfless misuse’, which is defined as the behaviors
engaged in by employees who misuse HIS with a strong intention to do good. Even though
selfless misuse is considered unethical or illegal, it can be a moral ‘right to do’ due to the
inevitability caused by uncertainty under disaster context. This is consistent with the study
that has shown that individuals tend to act altruistically when experiencing natural disasters
(i.e., giving, helping and sharing) (Li et al. 2013). For example, one may share passwords to
ensure the delivery of health services and business continuity for the sake of helping others.
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CHAPTER 4
MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
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Figure 1. The Proposed Model

Perceived System Risk
Perceived system risk is employees’ subjective expectations and assessments of the
risk caused by damage or loss to information systems (Straub and Welke 1998). In this study,
this perception of system risk could appear when employees perceive that their healthcare
information system (HIS) is detrimentally affected (Heal and Kunreuther 2007). Basically,
when any loss or disruption of HIS occurs, system risk would be impacted. We focus on
perceived system risk as a specific concept that has not been discussed in the context of
selfless misuse in prior IS literature, although it has been discussed with regard to perceived
HIS usefulness (Park et al. 2015). In the context of HIS, especially under disaster situations,
it could have a detrimental effect on employees’ selfless misuse intention, as system risk may
hinder the use of HIS. Since disasters can create damage and cause a loss of all or a portion of
the healthcare information system (HIS) functionality (Paustian et al. 2002), employees will
be unable to access information, share information and communicate with their colleagues. In
this case, employees will perceive their HIS ineffective and incapable in supporting their jobs
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under disasters, which will increase their perceived system risk that would in turn decrease
their perception of HIS usefulness (Park et al. 2015). Thus, this situation derived from
perceived system risk may lead employees to limited behavioral options to complete their jobs
by dealing with unexpected events. Due to employees’ fear to lose clinical and business
processes, their high perception of system risk could impact their behavior (Heal and
Kunreuther 2007) and negatively influence their performances (Park et al. 2015). As a result,
for the sake of delivery of health services and business continuity, employees may attempt to
selflessly misuse their HIS if doing so can help them to do their jobs, especially under
extreme and urgent situations. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: Perceived system risk increases employees’ selfless misuse intention
under disaster context.
A past study has found that there is an inverse relationship between perceived risk and
perceived benefit of an activity, which can be determined through the strength of positive or
negative affect that is associated with the activity (Alhakami and Slovic 1994). For instance,
when perception of risk is high for an activity or technology, this would lead to more negative
affect that would, in turn, decrease the perception of benefit of that activity or technology.
The definition of “affect” was as specific quality of “goodness” or “badness” that can be
experienced as a feeling state and demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus
(Slovic et al. 2004). In our study, we apply this approach and use intrinsic cost as specific
quality of “negative feeling” and intrinsic benefit as specific quality of “positive feeling” that
are associated with the usage of the healthcare information system (HIS). Disasters bring
employees’ perception of system risks, eventually it could lead high possibility of misusing
HIS. Since HIS is a fundamental infrastructure that is strongly supporting social community,
it should be continuously implemented to deliver health services and business continuity
under the disaster situations. Based on the study that people have shown the altruistic
tendency under extreme events (Li et al. 2013), hospital employees also would likely consider
misusing HIS to be benefits for stakeholders (i.e., patients, hospital), even though it may be
unethical or a violation of hospital policy. Thus, in hospitals under disaster situations, when
employees perceive high system risks, they would also feel that this type of misuse would be
a benefit to stakeholders. Thus, we hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 1b: Perceived system risk increases employees’ intrinsic benefit of selfless
misuse under disaster context.
Hypothesis 1c: Perceived system risk decreases employees’ intrinsic cost of selfless
misuse under disaster context.

Perceived System Resilience
The state of hospitals can be vulnerable if HIS is affected by the disasters because all
health practices and business processes rely on the availability of access to information,
information sharing, and communication. Prior studies have provided evidence suggesting
that poor information sharing and coordination has a negative influence on collective
decision-making and actions during disaster response (Dawes et al. 2004; Helsloot 2005;
Junglas and Ives 2007; Pan et al. 2005). The studies show that ensuring the functionality of
HIS is important for individuals to access information that can enhance the efficiency and
effectiveness of responses (Comfort et al. 2004; Horan and Schooley 2007). Thus, hospitals
should ensure access to information by increasing their system resilience, which is its ability
to adapt to and recover quickly from unexpected disruptions, which would include business
continuity, disaster recovery (Park et al. 2015), and IT systems configuration (Nemeth et al.
2008). Resilience has been shown to play an important role in the reduction of the
consequences of negative events (Heal and Kunreuther 2007) due to its capability to bounce
back (Wildavsky 1988) and reduce organizational vulnerabilities (Sheffi and Rice Jr 2005).
We argue that system resilience can play an important role in ensuring access to information,
which will facilitate the process of information sharing and communication. Thus, when HIS
is capable of ensuring information availability, employees will be able to do their jobs, which
can decrease their perceived system risk that would, in turn, lead to decrease their intrinsic
cost and increase their intrinsic benefit about using the healthcare information system (HIS).
As a result, this would in turn lead to increase the perceived benefits of HIS. This is consistent
with a study that has shown that when perception of risk is low for an activity or technology,
this would lead to more positive affect that would, in turn, increase the perception of benefit
of that activity or technology (Slovic et al. 2004). Hence, if hospitals have a resilient HIS to
handle unexpected events by ensuring access to information, employees will make better
decisions and act positively, which in turn leads to increase their intrinsic cost and decrease
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their intrinsic benefit of selfless misuse intention. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: Perceived system resilience is negatively associated with employees’
selfless misuse intention under disaster context.
Hypothesis 2b: Perceived system resilience is positively associated with employees’
intrinsic cost under disaster context.
Hypothesis 2c: Perceived system resilience is negatively associated with employees’
intrinsic benefit under disaster context.

Uncertainty
According to the Social Identity Theory (SIT), it posits that individuals tend to
maintain high self-esteem by classifying themselves into social groups (Goldberg et al. 2010).
In addition, prior studies have noted that reducing uncertainty in one’s identity is a primary
motive in social identification (Hogg 2008; Hogg and Abrams 1993; Smith et al. 2007). Since
disasters can decrease the perceived self-competence and self-esteem of individuals
(Wolfenstein 1957), individuals who are affected by them may experience negative
expectations of their identity in the organization. This is due to their lack of confidence in
their ability to predict particular outcomes under uncertainty (Penrod 2001). Hence,
individuals who are uncertain about their identity are particularly motivated to reduce their
uncertainty (Van Lange et al. 2011). As a result, in our study, we argue that employees’ sense
of unpredictability about the safety of patients, safety of hospital, capability of HIS to recover,
and their ability to perform the job under the context of disaster could motivate them to act
based on what enhances their identity. For example, employees may engage in selfless misuse
to ensure patient care and business continuity, which in turn leads to enhance their self-esteem
and self-competence. Thus, we posit that employees’ uncertainty may lead to increase their
intrinsic benefit, decrease their intrinsic cost, and increase their selfless misuse intention for
the sake of meeting their identity needs.
Hypothesis 3a: Uncertainty is positively associated with employees’ selfless misuse
intention under disaster context.
Hypothesis 3b: Uncertainty is positively associated with employees’ intrinsic benefit
under disaster context.
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Hypothesis 3c: Uncertainty is negatively associated with employees’ intrinsic cost
under disaster context.

Intrinsic Cost and Benefit
Intrinsic cost and benefit are intrinsic motivations that can help employees justify their
actions associated with HIS in terms of internal reasons, such as their own inspirations under
the context of disasters. In this study, we define intrinsic benefit as employees’ positive
feeling such as accomplishment, while intrinsic cost as employees’ negative feeling such as
stress (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). The literature shows that individuals are sensitive to the
consequences of their actions and make reasoned judgements based on the cost-benefit
analysis of the intended acts (Becker 1968; Cornish and Clarke 2014; Paternoster and
Simpson 1996). In disaster situation, employees may attempt to do sense-making, which is the
simplest way to find satisficing solutions that can help them to do their jobs while reducing
their uncertainty. Therefore, they may simply act based on a limited evaluation of intrinsic
cost and intrinsic benefit. Since Weick (2005) said, individuals tend to do sense-making in
order to meet their general long-term goals, we argue that employees’ intrinsic benefit may
dominate their intrinsic cost for the purpose of meeting their goals (i.e., organizational
commitment or altruism in the organization). This is consistent with the study that has shown
how responsible officials have failed to take appropriate actions during pre-impact periods of
possible disasters because of their fear about generating panic. The Weather Bureau and the
Coast Guard, for instance, have announced an immediate evacuation of the ocean resort town,
but city officials and the state police refused to order the evacuation because of their fear that
such action might precipitate a panicky flight, even though they knew that the only two
evacuation routes would become impossible if the hurricane heading for their low-lying area
was as intense as predicted (Quarantelli 1975). Their decision was inappropriate, but they
might have made it for the greater good. Thus, we believe that employees may act that way
because of the importance of delivery of health services and business continuity that may lead
to their organizational commitment or altruism in the organization. Thus, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 4: Employees’ intrinsic benefit is positively associated with their selfless
misuse intention under disaster context.
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On the other hand, employees should perceive that there is a cost associated with IS
misuse intention because based on the deterrence theory, prior studies have shown that
sanctions are so effective in deterring crimes related to computer security (Kankanhalli et al.
2003; Pahnila et al. 2007). For instance, a recent study has examined the antecedents of IS
misuse intention and found that perceived severity of sanctions can reduce IS misuse intention
(D'Arcy et al. 2009). Sanctions are indeed useful, but they are not the only events that can
lead to the formation of employees’ beliefs about the cost of not adhering to the securityrelated rules and regulations (Siponen 2000). Prior studies have highlighted the importance of
self-imposed punishment as an effective deterrent for corporate employees, especially in the
form of embarrassment and shame. They have also argued that self-imposed punishment can
discourage employees from committing corporate crimes, therefore they have suggested that
self-imposed punishment can be a highly strong source of social control (Paternoster and
Simpson 1993; Paternoster and Simpson 1996). In addition, research on deterrence has found
positive evidence that shame is a self-imposed sanction that can function as a deterrent and
decrease individuals’ motivations to perform crimes (Nagin and Paternoster 1993).
Furthermore, based on a recent study, intrinsic cost as a negative feeling such as stress has
been found effective in increasing employees’ overall expected unfavorable consequences for
noncompliance with the information security policy (ISP) (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Following
this study, we believe that employees’ intrinsic cost may decrease their motivations to act
inappropriately or illegally in their decision-making process, which is due to their expected
unfavorable consequences for noncompliance with ISP. Hence, this may lead to discourage
them to misuse the healthcare information system (HIS). Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: Employees’ intrinsic cost is negatively associated with their selfless
misuse intention under disaster context.

Control Variables
Based on the theory of planned behavior, it suggests that the intention to perform
various kinds of behaviors can be predicted with high accuracy from subjective norms (Ajzen
1991), therefore it postulates that behavior can be explained by normative beliefs as an
antecedent of subjective norms. Normative beliefs are defined as employees’ perceived social
pressure about not misusing the HIS caused by behavioral expectations of such important
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referent as colleagues (Ajzen 1991; Fishbein and Ajzen 1977). Hence, we add normative
beliefs to our model as a control variable since it has been found effective in explaining
behaviors. In addition, because the extant literature has shown that age and gender can predict
various forms of IS misuse (D'Arcy et al. 2009; Leonard and Cronan 2001; Leonard et al.
2004), in this study, age and gender are included as control variables. The study seeks to
assess the impact of perceived system risk, perceived system resilience, uncertainty, intrinsic
cost, and intrinsic benefit on selfless misuse intention, which is beyond these known
predictors. Therefore, we believe that including them as control variables are important to
account for potential differences in selfless misuse intention among users. Finally, we include
education and use time of the healthcare information system (HIS) as control variables as
well.

CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We used the survey method to test the proposed model. We developed the initial
survey instrument by identifying appropriate measurement scales that were adapted from the
existing measures used in prior studies that were proven reliable and valid. Additionally, we
developed new measures by closely following the definitions of the constructs in the study.
Table 1 presents all of the constructs, along with the definitions, number of their measurement
items, and sources. The survey questions are shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.
Data was collected by administering a web-based questionnaire survey. The pool of
survey participants was obtained from multiple hospitals located across the United States. We
asked the research company to contact participants who are employed by hospitals located in
disastrous areas in the United States. In total, 307 surveys were completed and included in the
data analysis. A summary of the demographic characteristics of respondents is provided in
Table 2.
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Table 1. Definitions and Sources of Measurement Items
Constructs

Definitions

Items
(reference)

SR

Subjective expectations

4 items

and assessments of the

(Bulgurcu

risks caused by the loss or

et al. 2010)

disruption of HIS (Straub
and Welke 1998).
SRE

Beliefs regarding the

4 items*

capacity of the information
systems to maintain and
cope with damages or
losses (Rose 2004).
UNT

IB

Lack of confidence in

2 items

individuals’ ability to

(Afifi et al.

predict particular outcomes

2012)

(Penrod 2001).

2 items*

Positive feeling such as

4 items

accomplishment.

(Bulgurcu
et al. 2010)

IC

Negative feeling such as

4 items

stress.

(Bulgurcu
et al. 2010)

NB

Perceived social pressure

4 items

caused by behavioral

(Ajzen

expectations of such

1991)

important referent as
colleagues.
SM

Intention to misuse HIS to

2 items

do good.

(D'Arcy et
al. 2009) 2
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items*
C.V.

Normative beliefs (Ajzen
1991), age, gender,
education, HIS use time

Note: SR: Perceived System Risk, SRE: Perceived
System Resilience, UNT: Uncertainty, IB: Intrinsic
Benefit, IC: Intrinsic Cost, NB: Normative Beliefs,
SM: Selfless Misuse Intention, C.V.: Control
Variables, Items*: developed by authors
Table 2. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Survey participants (n = 307)
Gender
Male
Female

44
261

14.4%
85.6%

Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55 and over

0
5
39
65
198

0.0%
1.6%
12.7%
21.2%
64.5%

Education
Less than High School
High School / GED
Some College
2-year College Degree
4-year College Degree
Master’s Degree
Doctoral Degree
Professional Degree (JD, MD)

0
20
39
65
121
32
9
21

0.0%
6.5%
12.7%
21.2%
39.4%
10.4%
2.9%
6.8%

Healthcare information system use time
(years)
Range
Mean
Std. deviation

1—20
8.74
5.98
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CHAPTER 6
DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Data Analysis
Partial least squares (PLS), as implemented in SmartPLS version 2.0.M3, was used for
data analysis due to its capability to allow researchers to assess measurement model
parameters and structural path coefficients simultaneously. Since this study was primarily
intended for causal-predictive analysis, the PLS approach should be an appropriate statistical
analysis tool because it focuses on a prediction-oriented and data-analytic method, seeking to
maximize the variances that are explained in the constructs (Barclay et al. 1995).

Common Method Bias
To identify common method bias in our study, we conducted a full collinearity test.
This comprehensive procedure is fully automated by the software WarpPLS, which can
generate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all the latent constructs in the model. If VIFs are
greater than 3.3, this means that the model may be contaminated by common method bias. On
the other hand, if VIFs are equal to or lower than 3.3, the model can be considered free of
common method bias (Kock 2015). Based on the full collinearity test, our model is free of
common method bias because all the VIFs are lower than 3.3 (see Table 3).
Table 3. Full Collinearity VIFs
SR SRE UNT
1.334 1.05 1.34

IB
1.28

IC SM
1.3 1.257

Measurement Model
The measurement model for all measures in the PLS analysis was assessed by
examining internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Barclay et al.
1995). Table 4 shows that all validity and reliability are good with the average variance
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extracted (AVE), cronbach’s alpha (CA), and composite reliability (CR). All of the factor
loadings exceeded 0.70, indicating adequate reliability (see Table 5). In addition, the square
root of the average variance extracted (AVE) of each construct was greater than its correlation
with other constructs.
Table 4. Inter-construct Correlation
CA
SR

CR AVE SR

SRE UNT

IB

IC

SM

0.93 0.95 0.84 0.91

SRE 0.94 0.96 0.85 0.06 0.92
UNT 0.90 0.93 0.76 0.45 0.14 0.87
IB

0.90 0.93 0.77 0.18 -0.01 0.14 0.88

IC

0.93 0.95 0.83 -0.09 0.11 -0.12 -0.40 0.91

SM 0.93 0.95 0.82 0.27 -0.03 0.27 0.31 -0.28 0.91
Note: SR: Perceived System Risk, SRE: Perceived System
Resilience, UNT: Uncertainty, IB: Intrinsic Benefit, IC:
Intrinsic Cost, NB: Normative Beliefs, SM: Selfless Misuse
Intention.
Table 5. Cross-Loadings
SR1
SR2
SR3
SR4
SRE1
SRE2
SRE3
SRE4
UNT1
UNT2
UNT3
UNT4
IB1
IB2
IB3

SR
0.88
0.91
0.93
0.93
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.09
0.36
0.38
0.43
0.41
0.17
0.10
0.22

SRE
0.02
0.08
0.04
0.09
0.91
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.14
0.15
0.19
0.06
-0.01
0.01
-0.01

UNT
0.46
0.41
0.39
0.39
0.10
0.11
0.15
0.17
0.87
0.89
0.86
0.87
0.12
0.13
0.17

IB
0.16
0.18
0.16
0.17
-0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.03
0.14
0.13
0.12
0.10
0.90
0.78
0.92

IC
-0.07
-0.07
-0.10
-0.10
0.10
0.06
0.06
0.13
-0.08
-0.09
-0.06
-0.16
-0.38
-0.31
-0.33

SM
0.23
0.27
0.27
0.23
-0.08
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
0.18
0.22
0.15
0.33
0.28
0.25
0.25
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IB4
IC1
IC2
IC3
IC4
SM1
SM2
SM3
SM4

0.15
-0.14
-0.03
-0.07
-0.09
0.23
0.26
0.24
0.26

-0.04
0.09
0.07
0.09
0.12
0.03
-0.01
-0.05
-0.09

0.08
-0.13
-0.06
-0.11
-0.13
0.24
0.26
0.24
0.25

0.91
-0.36
-0.35
-0.39
-0.34
0.28
0.26
0.28
0.29

-0.37
0.90
0.87
0.94
0.92
-0.22
-0.26
-0.29
-0.25

0.30
-0.24
-0.24
-0.28
-0.26
0.90
0.90
0.93
0.90

Structural Model Testing
Figure 2 presents the path coefficients for the structural model. First, as we
hypothesized in H1a, perceived system risk had a significant positive effect on selfless misuse
intention (β = 0.146, p < 0.05). The positive effect of perceived system risk (H1b) was also
significant for the intrinsic benefit of selfless misuse (β = 0.150, p < 0.05). The relationship
between perceived system risk and intrinsic cost of selfless misuse (H1c) is not significant (β
= -0.047). Next, for hypothesis H2a, the effect of perceived system resilience on misuse
intention is not significant (β = -0.043). For H2b, perceived system resilience has a positive
effect on intrinsic cost (β = 0.125, p < 0.05). For H2c, the effect of perceived system
resilience on intrinsic benefit is not significant (β = -0.034).
Uncertainty
-0.117

Intrinsic
Cost H3a -

-0.047

Perceived
System Risk

0.146*
0.150*

0.163**
-0.144*
0.077

Selfless
Misuse
Intention

-0.043

Perceived
System
Resilience

0.125*

Intrinsic
Benefit

-0.034

∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001.

0.188**
Control Variables

Normative
Beliefs
(-0.091)

Figure 2. Results of Data Analysis

Age (0.070)
Gender (-0.097)
Education (0.009)
Use Time (0.020)
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For hypothesis H3a, uncertainty has a significant positive effect on selfless misuse
intention (β = 0.163, p < 0.01), while on intrinsic benefit (H3b) and intrinsic cost (H3c), the
one is not significant (β = 0.077, β = -0.117).
For H4, intrinsic benefit has a positive effect on selfless misuse intention (β = 0.188, p
< 0.01). For H5, the effect of intrinsic cost is also significant for selfless misuse intention (β =
-0.144, p < 0.05).

Post-Hoc Analysis
The purpose of the post-hoc analysis is to investigate the indirect effects of both
perceived system risk and perceived system resilience on selfless misuse intention via two
mediators, which are intrinsic cost and intrinsic benefit. To test for the significance of our
indirect effects, we employed Sobel’s mediation test (Sobel 1982). Due to the multiple
mediators (intrinsic cost and intrinsic benefit), we investigated the effect of each respective
mediator on the relationships in our model. While controlling for each mediator, this way
allowed us to explore a specific mediated path, which provided information on the unique
effect of each mediator (Bolger 1998). The results showed that perceived system risk
significantly affects selfless misuse intention via only intrinsic benefit (β = 0.04, p < 0.05),
while the indirect effect of perceived system resilience on selfless misuse intention via only
intrinsic cost was significant (β = -0.03, p < 0.05).

CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Discussion
As hypothesized, we found that perceived system risk has a direct positive effect on
selfless misuse intention. Besides that, we found that perceived system risk has a positive
effect on intrinsic benefit as well. For perceived system resilience, we found that is not related
to selfless misuse intention, while it has a significant positive effect on intrinsic cost.

29
One of findings says that uncertainty has a significant positive effect on selfless
misuse intention, but not on intrinsic benefit and intrinsic cost. This suggests that employees
do not consider the uncertainty as a factor for their cognitive judgement about how it would
be cost or benefit for their decisions. Instead, it is considered as a factor to be minimized by
making decision to misuse.
The post-hoc analysis shows interesting results about the differential effects of both
mediators. That is, intrinsic benefit only mediates the effect of perceived system risk, while
intrinsic cost only mediates the effect of perceived system resilience. A possible explanation
is that employees highly likely consider intrinsic benefit of misusing HIS when being unable
to perform their job due to system risks. On the other hand, they high likely consider intrinsic
cost when being able to perform their job by relying on system resilience. This indicates that
employees are more likely motivated to engage in selfless misuse based on the level of their
perception of system risk as well as system resilience.
These findings eventually suggest that individuals in disaster contexts try to think
rationally using rational tools such as cost-benefit approach, but there are still unexpected
issues that they are not able to consider in their rational cognitive process. Obviously,
uncertainty is the one of these issues and this brings them to the limited rational decision
making that should be processed by cost-benefit approach. Specifically, our research shows
that even though individuals act rationally based on the calculation of the cost-benefit analysis
(Rational Choice Theory), their high level of uncertainty affects their decision-making but not
this calculus process.
Furthermore, unlike a recent study (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) has shown that individuals
tend to act rationally by increasing their benefit of compliance and increasing their cost of
noncompliance with information security policy (ISP), this study shows that individuals tend
to increase their intrinsic benefit and intrinsic cost based on their perception of system risk
and resilience as factors affecting their decision-making process. Our results have
demonstrated how individuals tend to engage in selfless misuse by increasing their intrinsic
benefit even though it is against ISP, which is the opposite to the finding of the abovementioned study as individuals increase their benefit of compliance with ISP. On the other
hand, we showed that individuals increase their intrinsic cost of selfless misuse, especially
when they are expecting unfavorable consequences for noncompliance with ISP.
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Finally, based on the results, we found several insignificant relationships in the model.
Interestingly, perceived system risk had an insignificant effect on intrinsic cost, whereas
perceived system resilience had insignificant effects on both intrinsic benefit and selfless
misuse intention. This indicates that employees are less likely influenced by their perception
of system resilience when deciding to engage in selfless misuse. This is probably due to their
high level of perception of system risk caused by disaster context. On the other hand, we also
found that uncertainty had no significant effects on both intrinsic benefit and intrinsic cost.
This finding suggests that employees are more likely influenced by their perception of system
risk and resilience during their decision-making process. This could be due to the reasoning
process employees engage in when deciding to selflessly misuse the HIS. For example,
employees engage in the process of assessing their intrinsic benefit and cost of selfless misuse
with a reason such as loss or disruption of the HIS. In this case, they assess them based on the
level of their perception of system risk and resilience. Otherwise, if employees are under
uncertainty, they immediately engage in selfless misuse without hesitation, which is why its
significant direct effect on selfless misuse was very strong (β = 0.163, p < 0.01).

Theoretical Contributions
Our current study makes several significant contributions to the IS literature in terms
of behavioral and organizational issues of information security. Based on our conceptual
research model, we showed that perceived system risk and perceived system resilience play a
role in affecting employees’ decision-making process under the context of disaster.
Specifically, we showed that employees’ perceived system risk can impact their cost-benefit
assessment as well as their decision-making by increasing their intrinsic benefit and selfless
misuse intention. Besides that, we showed that perceived system resilience can enhance
employees’ cost-benefit assessment by increasing their intrinsic cost of selfless misuse.
Next, drawing on the concept of bounded rationality, since employees’ cognitive
limitations and lack of information under the context of disaster can lead them to act with a
high level of uncertainty, we showed how uncertainty can directly lead them to engage in
selfless misuse. In addition, we showed how employees tend to increase their intrinsic benefit
of selfless misuse during their cost-benefit assessment for the purpose of meeting their goals
as well. These results indicate that employees make poor decisions under disaster context due
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to their high uncertainty and perceptions of system risk. Therefore, they engage directly in
selfless misuse even though there is a cost associated with it. On the other hand, the results
also indicate that employees are influenced by system resilience during their decision-making
process, therefore they consider selfless misuse as a negative consequence leading to their
high intrinsic cost.
Finally, while the extant literature has investigated individuals’ IS misuse, violations,
workarounds, and complying with security policies, this study is the first to investigate
employees’ selfless misuse, especially in the context of healthcare. Current theories, concepts,
and models may not be operational under the context of selfless misuse because this concept
is brought by the context of disaster. Our study demonstrates that employees tend to act
altruistically under the context of disaster, especially in hospitals, therefore their misuse is
considered both inappropriate and beneficial. As a result, selfless misuse may not be
applicable in the existing models, which is due to its conceptualization as misuse with a
strong intention to do good.

Practical Implications
The study offers important practical implications for HIS security management
practice. First, our results indicate that employees act poorly under extreme events, which is
due to their high uncertainty and perception of system risk. Therefore, they tend to selflessly
misuse HIS for the sake of delivery of health services and business continuity. When
implementing a security policy, HIS security management should address how the
enforcement of security policies can ensure a proper functionality of the healthcare
information system, delivery of health services, and business continuity. This is consistent
with the interview with the chief information officer of a hospital that was affected by the
October 2006 snowstorm of western New York, “Having strong security processes may not
help or may even hinder access to data during disaster situations. However, having a strong
security posture would make people realize the hospital has good processes in managing the
system at the data center and clinical levels for business continuity.” (Park et al., 2015, p.
319).
Second, the findings of the present study raise some serious questions about the
practical effectiveness of deterrent measures in reducing employees’ inappropriate behavior.
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If employees are cognitively limited and trying to ensure delivery of health services and
business continuity for the greater good, prohibiting certain means of using HIS (e.g., misuse
intention) will be problematic. Thus, it is important for HIS security management to provide
alternative means that can help employees make the right decisions when performing their
job, especially under extreme events. Such alternative means would be more useful for
employees and thus would reduce their selfless misuse intention.
Third, this study indicates that employees’ perception of system risks, uncertainty, and
intrinsic benefit have a significant influence on their selfless misuse intention. This suggests
that HIS security management should shift the way they train and educate employees. The
HIS security management usually provides sufficient training and education to make
employees aware of potential security risks, but that may not be sufficient since security risks
may be too vague for employees. More importantly, security training and education should
enable employees to have a good understanding of how the organization is capable of
managing the healthcare information system for business continuity as well as make them
realize that HIS misuse will affect the business performance of the organization.
Finally, hospitals should ensure the functionality of the healthcare information system
(HIS) and access to information by increasing the ability of systems to adapt to and recover
quickly from unexpected disruptions, which would include business continuity, disaster
recovery, and IT systems configuration. Our results indicate that perceived system resilience
can play an impotent role in discouraging employees to selflessly misuse their HIS.

CHAPTER 8
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND
CONCLUSIONS
Certain limitations of this study should be considered in interpreting our results. First,
this study used specific IS misuse behaviors, therefore a limitation of this is that these IS
misuse behaviors do not include every possible type of security violation. Thus, future
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research should include more types of IS misuse behaviors to further test the proposed selfless
misuse model. Second, we limited the concept of selfless misuse, which is defined as
“Intention to misuse HIS to do good”, to the context of healthcare. Future research should
examine selfless misuse in other different organizations under the context of disaster. A third
limitation is that the study used selfless misuse intention instead of actual behaviors. Although
intention is supported by the literature as a predictor of actual behavior, individuals may not
behave as they have indicated. Hence, to add additional credibility to our model, future
research should reexamine the model in a context where actual selfless misuse can be
measured. A last limitation is that the study collected data from hospitals that are only located
in disastrous areas. Future research should reexamine the model in a normal context where
selfless misuse intention can be measured under normal situations.
Overall, the research profiled in this paper would contribute to understanding how
hospital employees would misuse their information systems under disaster contexts. The
results would call attention to how risk and resilience influence employees’ decision-making
process and misuse intention. We hope that this study serves as encouragement for future
research endeavors.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Survey Questions
Constructs

Items

Scale
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Uncertainty

Due to the natural disaster situation, I

1 = Strongly disagree

was uncertain about______.

7 = Strongly agree

1. the safety of patients.
2. the safety of the hospital.
3. the capability of the healthcare

information system (HIS) to
recover.
4. how to perform my job.

Perceived System

Since the natural disaster occurred in

1 = Strongly disagree

Risk

the area, the loss or disruption of

7 = Strongly agree

the healthcare information
system______.
1. held me back from doing my

actual work.
2. slowed my response time to my

colleagues, patients, and
managers.
3. hindered my productivity at

work.
4. impeded my efficiency at work.

Intrinsic Benefit

Due to the loss or disruption of

1 = Completely disagree

the healthcare information system,

7 = Completely agree

performing my job by______.
1. sharing passwords to do good
makes me feel accomplished.
2. accessing restricted information
to deliver health services makes
me feel accomplished.
3. disclosing unauthorized
confidential information to
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ensure patient care makes me
feel accomplished.
4. using email inappropriately to
continue business makes me
feel accomplished.
Intrinsic Cost

Due to the loss or disruption of

1 = Completely disagree

the healthcare information system,

7 = Completely agree

performing my job by______.
1. sharing passwords to do good
makes me feel stressed.
2. accessing restricted information
to deliver health services makes
me feel stressed.
3. disclosing unauthorized
confidential information to
ensure patient care makes me
feel stressed.
4. using email inappropriately to
continue business makes me
feel stressed.
Perceived System

During the natural disaster situation,

1 = Strongly disagree

Resilience

the healthcare information system was

7 = Strongly agree

able to adapt to and recover quickly
from disruptions, which_______.
1. improved my ability to do my
actual work.
2. enhanced my response time to
my colleagues, patients, and
managers.
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3. increased my productivity at
work.
4. increased my efficiency at
work.
Normative Beliefs

During the natural disaster situation,

1 = Completely disagree

my colleagues think that I should

7 = Completely agree

not_______.
1. share passwords to do good.
2. access restricted information to

deliver health services.
3. disclose unauthorized

confidential information to
ensure patient care.
4. use email inappropriately to

continue business.

Selfless Misuse

During the natural disaster situation, I

1 = Strongly disagree

Intention

intend to________.

7 = Strongly agree

1. share passwords to do good.
2. access restricted information to
deliver health services.
3. disclose unauthorized
confidential information to
ensure patient care.
4. use email inappropriately to
continue business.

